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Case Comment
REGINA V. CAMPBELL (1964) 2 O.R. 487, 46 D.L.R. (2D) 83--CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW - PROHIBITION OF DEALER RESALE PRICE MAIN-
TENANCE - WHETHER VALID FEDERAL CRIMINAL LEGISLATION -
WHETHER VALID LEGISLATION UNDER REGULATION OF TRADE AND COM-
MERCE-COMBINES INVESTIGATION ACT (CAN.), S. 34-In 1950, for
the purpose of making Canadian anti-combines law a more effective
instrument for the encouraging and safeguarding of our free economy,
the MacQuarrie Committee was appointed to make recommendations.
As a result of an Interim Report in 1951 by the Committee, the Par-
liament of Canada enacted amendments to the Combines Investigation
Act,1 one of which was section 34, as follows:
34 (1) In this section "dealer" means a person engaged in the business
of manufacturing or supplying or selling any article or commodity.(2) No dealer shall directly or indirectly by agreement, threat,
promise, or any other means whatsoever, require or induce or attempt
to require or induce any other person to resell an article or commodity,(b) at a price not less than a minimum price specified by the dealer
or established by agreement.
The problem of whether or not this section is valid legislation
by the Parliament of Canada raises two obvious issues. Firstly, is
section 34 proper criminal legislation within s. 91(27) of the British
North America Act, or is it an unwarranted interference with pro-
vincial rights in respect of contracts and property rights under s. 92
(13) and s. 92(16) of that Act? A third issue which is discussed below
relates to the possibility of s. 34 being proper federal legislation
under s. 91(2)--the Trade and Commerce head.
In the recent decision of Regina v. Campbe 2 the Ontario Court
of Appeal answered the first two of these constitutional issues, hold-
ing by a 3-2 majority that section 34 was valid as Criminal law and
did not improperly infringe Property and Civil Rights. The possible
validity of section 34 under the Trade and Commerce power was not
dealt with. Briefly, the facts in this case are as follows: an American
based company which manufactured and supplied surgical blades,
established the accused, Campbell, as sales-promoter in Toronto in
the position of manager of a branch office. In such capacity, he super-
vised various retail merchants who made contracts of sale with hos-
pitals. These contracts were according to a standard form provided
by the company, and began with the words, "Subject to the approval
of Bard-Parker Company. . . we agree to purchase from the dealers
. . ."; the contract form also provided that the retailer might allow
a discount of 20% off the "current printed list price" (in the com-
pany's catalogue) if a certain quantity of blades were purchased. A
1 R.S.C. 1952, c. 314.
2 R. v. CampbefZ [1964] 2 O.R. 487, 46 D.L.R. (2d) 83.
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completely separate agreement between the company and the retailer
allowed the latter a 5% rebate in return for the submission to the
company of a complete record of sales.
On an indictment under s. 34(2) (b) of the Combines Investiga-
tion Act, accused was convicted of aiding and abetting the company
in the offence and this was upheld by a majority of the Court of
Appeal. Since the company had knowledge of sales and prices, it was
decided that the company might exert control or pressure over
dealers regarding price (even though in fact there was no threat to
exert pressure!). Also, since the contract was subject to company
approval, the Court held that the company had control over retail
prices.
Speaking for the majority on the constitutional issue, Schroeder,
J.A. held s. 34 to be intra vires the Parliament of Canada on the basis
that its essential nature is to "safeguard the public against the evil
consequences of the commercial activities therein described, since their
effect was to impose restraints upon free and equal competition",
a practice which in the opinion of Parliament, "ought to be suppressed
in the public interest".3 Since the "pith and substance" of such legisla-
tion is criminal, it is thereby valid within s. 91 (27) of the B.N.A. Act.
Applying the Proprietary Articles Trade Association4 case, which
upheld the validity of the 1927 Combines Investigation Act as being
intra vires the Parliament of Canada pursuant to s. 91 (27), Schroeder,
J.A. also held that, since the "pith and substance" of s. 34 came
within the enumerated heads of s. 91, it was "not material that s. 34
affected property and civil rights in the Provinces".
On the other hand, Porter, C.J.O., speaking for the minority on
this issue, decided that Parliament has not the power under the
B.N.A. Act to create a crime relating to the trade practice defined in
s. 34 by attaching a penalty to a breach of that section. Admitting
that Parliament does have "plenary powers" to create crimes which
may affect provincial rights, he considers that this wide scope which
is allowed to Parliament is subject to limitation under the B.N.A.
Act. In his approach to the question of the validity of s. 34, Porter,
C.J.O. considers various factors. He states that:
The mere fact that persons might have been induced to enter into a con.
tract or to act upon a promise to establish a policy as to prices, does not,per se, imply restraint upon competition or harm to the public in any
other way. Much would depend at any particular time upon the general
state of the economy, the presence or absence of monopolistic concentra-
tions of such a character that the interest of the public might become
adversely affected, or the fact that any agreements in question are so
widely accepted by the particular trade as a whole that the competitive
factor becomes substantially weakened.
. . What may be a detrimental trade practice at one time may cease
to be, due to the impact of new forms of competition or many other
factors.5
3 Id. at 119 (D.L.R.).
4 [19311 2 D.L.R. 1.
5 P. 94 D.L.R.
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Porter, C.J.O., then analyzed the Proprietary case and decided
that Lord Atkin's decision to the effect that the domain of criminal
jurisprudence can be ascertained by whatever the State prohibits,
notwithstanding the true nature and substance6 of the legislation
enacted, should be confined to the facts of that case. In that legisla-
tion,7 the essential element of a criminal combine is that it has
operated, or is likely to operate to the detriment or against the in-
terest of the public. The mere agreement to fix a price is not an
offence under the section. It must be a fixing of the price which does
or is likely to operate to the detriment or against the interest of the
public, so that, in a prosecution under this section "the Court would
have to determine the issue as to whether there was in fact detriment
or likelihood of detriment to the public".8
What limitation should be imposed on the power of Parliament
to make trade practices criminal? Porter, C.J.O., suggests the follow-
ing limitation: if the legislation comes under an exclusive head of
s. 91, and does not infringe on s. 92, then it is valid, even apart from
any question of harm to the public. But, secondly, if the legislation
also comes under an exclusive head of s. 92 (as does s. 34 in Camp-
bell), then regard must be had to the circumstances "in their relation
to the legislation to determine whether there has been a colourable
attempt, or in truth and substance an encroachment, or whether
there has been a genuine attempt to amend the law".9
Generalizing on the authorities mentioned, particularly the
Board of Commerce o case, Porter, C.J.O. deduces the main purpose
of criminal law as being to "protect the public against injury by the
wilful wrongdoing of others". And so, the constitutional validity of
criminal legislation would depend on the manner in which the statute
is framed "either by its terms defining offences implicitly harmful
or by making provision for proof of such". Since s. 34 does not define
a practice which by implication was harmful during the period
covered by the charge before the court, nor required proof of harm,
it does not meet the above requirement and, hence, is (in the dissent-
ing opinion of the court) ultra vires, the Parliament of Canada.
Thus it appears that the judiciary is still not in agreement as
to the criterion to be applied to decide in what circumstances Parlia-
ment can create a crime out of some trade practice. It is well estab-
lished11 that some anti-combines legislation is necessary to ensure
the existence of an effective degree of competition. Competition is
assumed to be the "mainspring and regulator of our free enterprise
6 A criterion used by Lord Haldane in the Board of Commerce case [1922)
1 A.C. 191.
7 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. (1927), c. 26, s. 2(a) which defines
a combine.8 R. v. Cam pbell (1964) 46 D.L.R. (2d) 83, 97 (for the purpose of criminal
prosecution).
9 Id. at 99.
10 [19221 1 A.C. 191.
11 See: D. G. Blair, Combines, Controls or Competition (1953) 31 C.B.R.
1083 at 1084.
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system". 12 The problem facing us is the form of such legislation. In
order to understand what it is we are trying to preserve, we must
have a basic understanding of the meaning of competition.
A consideration in establishing a criterion is the fact that in
Canada, the maintenance of competition is a much larger issue than
the effective operation of anti-trust laws.13 Since the B.N.A. Act does
not easily permit unified, national economic policies to be translated
into law where these policies deal directly with prices and products,
the judge must translate into legal norms the community sense of
the limits to be placed on business activity that may be harmful to
competition. With this in mind, a strong objection to the decision in
Campbell may be raised: why should a businessman, exercising his
apparently normal rights, be accused of and convicted of a crime
when his activities come within s. 34 of the Combines Investigation
Act?
It is clear 14 that agreements in restraint of trade which result
in public detriment ought to be prohibited by law. But should "restric-
tive trade practices", as such, be made crimes punishable by fine and
imprisonment? The essence of a crime is mens rea-a guilty intent.
But in anti-combines legislation, the crime is the agreement' 5 to
suppress competition, and the intention to accomplish this constitutes
the mens tea; in other words, the court finds guilt not in intent, but
in result. In s. 2(a) (vi) of the Combines Investigation Act, "combine"
is defined generally as a "merger, trust or monopoly which . . . has
operated or is likely to operate to the detriment or against the interest
of the public .
Why is it expedient to make crimes of acts which appear to have
been done innocently? Because of the B.N.A. Act, of which s. 91(27)
gives to Parliament legislative authority over "The Criminal Law
.. .including the Procedure in Criminal Matters". Since anti-com-
bines legislation obviously interferes with property and civil rights,
it is upheld as valid on the ground that it is genuine criminal law, or
necessarily incidental or ancillary to it. This is the ground used in the
Proprietary16 case by Lord Atkin who distinguished the prior Board
of Commerce17 case (which had held previous anti-combines legisla-
tion ultra vires the Dominion Parliament) on that ground in the
following words:
If Parliament genuinely determines that commercial activities which can
be described as 'operating or likely to operate to the detriment of or
against the interest of the public' are to be suppressed in the public
interest . .. then there is no reason why Parliament should not make
them crimes.18
12 Id. at 1084.
13 M. Cohen, Background, Main Features and Problems of MacQuarrie
Committee Report, 30 C.B.R. 551.
14 H. Hansard, Q.C., Combines, Criminal Law, and the Constitution, 30
C.B.R. 566.15 R. v. Container Materials Ltd. et al. (1940) 4 D.L.R. 293.
16 [19311 A.C. 310.
17 [1922] 1 A.C. 191.
18 Op cit. at p. 323.
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The point of objection is this: In order to assume jurisdiction
over matters that otherwise belong to the provincial field, Parliament
has chosen to make crimes of acts and situations that would not
ordinarily have been regarded as criminal, and in so doing, has con-
fronted the business and industrial community with the continuing
threat of being prosecuted and treated as criminals for things done
entirely without a guilty intent.
Regarding the third issue mentioned in the opening part of this
article, could resale price maintenance be controlled by legislation
justified under s. 91(2) -the "Regulation of Trade and Commerce"
power of Parliament? In E. v. Campbell, it was contended by the
accused that it could not, and Porter, C.J.O. agreed with him,
although the majority of the Court of Appeal did not find it necessary
to consider this contention. The basis for his Lordship's finding was
the Natural Products Marketing Act case19 which involved federal
legislation purporting to set up a general regulatory scheme for
natural products under the authority of s. 91(2). He quotes Lord
Atkin who, in holding such legislation ultra vires the Parliament of
Canada, said:
Parliament cannot acquire jurisdiction to deal in the sweeping way in
which these enactments operate with such local and provincial matters
by legislating at the same time respecting external and interprovincial
trade, and committing the regulation of external and interprovincial
trade and the regulation of trade which is exclusively local and of traders
and producers engaged in trade which is exclusively local to the same
authority.20
Although in this case it was not applied, the "necessarily in-
cidental" doctrine should not be forgotten. Generally, Parliament, in
legislating in relation to a subject committed to its authority (where
the substance of such legislation concerns that ubject), might reach
out to include provincial matters which are ancillary or necessarily
incidental thereto. And in this area it has been said recently2' that
"one would have thought that no more appropriate occasion for the
application of the necessarily incidental rule could arise than where
extra-provincial and local elements are inextricably intermingled ...
Parliament has been precluded from exercising an admitted power
on the ground that such exercise would necessarily embrace matters
in themselves local and private. Yet it is said that where the authority
of Parliament exists it dominates. It is a hollow paramountcy that
must yield to provincial authority".
A test to differentiate between legislation justifiable under s.
91 (2) or s. 92 (13) was put forth by Anglin, J. in the Board of Com-
merce case,22 which is as follows:
19 Reference re Natura Products Marketing Act, 1934 [1937] 1 D.L.R. 691.20 Ibid at p. 695.
21 Alexander Smith, The Commerce Power in Canada and the United
States, (Toronto, 1963), at p. 143.22 In Re The Board of Commerce Act and The Combines and Fair Prices
Act, 1919 (1920) 60 S.C.R. 456.
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Is it as primarily dealt with in its true nature and character, in its pith
and substance, as a question of general interest throughout the Dominion,
or is it from a provincial point of view of a local or private nature?
This case involved federal legislation designed to control and
regulate prices of certain clothing commodities, allegedly not sold at
reasonable prices, and thereby allegedly encouraging unfair profits
among a certain group of retailers. Such legislation was held to be
invalid under s. 91 (2), having regard to the authority conferred upon
the federal Board to interfere with proprietary rights of producers,
holders, and consumers of any of the articles to which the Act applied,
and with regard to the authority to prescribe the conditions of con-
tracts relating to such articles.
In the Privy Council report, upholding the invalidity of the
legislation, Viscount Haldane adds :23
It can be only under necessity in highly exceptional circumstances ...
that the liberty of the inhabitants of the Provinces may be restricted
by the Parliament of Canada and that the Dominion can intervene In the
interests of Canada as a whole. For, normally, the subject matter to be
dealt with would be one falling within s. 92... It may well be, if Parlia-
ment had, by reason of an altogether exceptional situation, capacity to
interfere, then s. 91(2) would apply so as to enable Parliament to oust
the exclusive character of the Provincial powers unders s. 92.
In R. v. Campbell, could it be said that such an "exceptional situa-
tion" exists? If so, then perhaps s. 34 could be justified under s. 91 (2).
Before this can be decided, a quotation from the Farm Products Mar-
keting Act case24 may be relevant. That case held valid certain pro-
vincial legislation which authorized a comprehensive pool marketing
scheme for the distribution, among producers, of money received
from the sale of regulated products supplied. The basis of its validity
was its sole applicability to transactions within the Province, with no
power over exports. Kerwin, C.J. said:
The concept of Trade and Commerce, the regulation of which is con-
fided to Parliament, is entirely separate and distinct from the regulation
of mere sale and purchase agreements. Once an article enters into the
flow of interprovincial or external trade, the subject matter and all Its
attendant circumstances cease to be a mere matter of local concern.25
This concept of a "current", "flow", or "stream" of commerce
"involves the recognition of the phenomenon that elements, in them-
selves local, may be integrated into a sequence so as to constitute a
current of commerce across provincial or international lines".2 6
The majority (including Kerwin, C.J.) generally took a liberal view
that intra-provincial activity and provincial authority are not co-
extensive, as opposed to the more orthodox minority view that since
the scheme was set up for intra-provincial transactions, validity neces-
sarily followed.
23 [19221 1 A.C. 191 (italics added).
24 Reference Re The Farm Products Marketing Act, R.S.O. 1950, c. 131
(1957) S.C.R. 198.
25 Id. at 205 (italics added).
26 Id. at 160.
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The liberal approach of the Farm Products Marketing Act case
(although not cited) was carried forward in Regina v. Klassen,27 de-
cided in the Manitoba Court of Appeal. The case is relatively simple,
yet it serves to illustrate what influence the new pragmatic approach
may achieve. The validity of the Canadian Wheat Board Act, the
purpose of which was to regulate the marketing of grain in inter-
provincial and foreign trade, was upheld even as applied to a feed
mill which was an entirely local enterprise from beginning to end, on
the basis that the exercise of control over feed mills is necessarily in-
cidental to the scheme of the Act.
So now to the problem at hand: Can resale price maintenance be
controlled by legislation authorized under s. 91(2)? On Anglin, J.'s
test, is it a subject of which the primary aspect is not local and
private in nature, but is of general interest throughout the Dominion?
On the one hand, it seems to be essentially a matter of contract
which the Province should control; yet, if the practice of maintaining
resale prices were so widespread and prevalent in a certain trade as
to justify its regulation in this respect, Parliament might well assume
jurisdiction in the public interest. Also, in this case, Viscount Hal-
dane's "exceptional situation" might justify federal intervention in
the interests of Canada as a whole. But how would it have to be
"exceptional"? Perhaps in the sense that this manner of carrying
on sales contracting'is such a deviation from the usual way of exer-
cising civil rights that federal intervention would be justified?
Another consideration for the possible validation of s. 34 under
s. 91(2) is Kerwin, C.J.'s idea of the "flow of interprovincial or ex-
ternal trade" which would put legislation in respect of an article
involved in such a flow out of provincial hands, and justify federal
legislation which would regulate the article's movement and "all its
attendant circumstances". This consideration may be relevant to the
facts of R. v. Campbel and with respect to s. 34. Accused was the
Canadian agent for an American company which supplied goods
manufactured in the United ,States to retailers in Canada for resale,
supposedly throughout various provinces, (although the case is un-
clear in this respect). Whether or not these conditions would justify
federal legislation prohibiting resale price maintenance would depend,
of course, on various factors such as the extent of trade (which,
seemingly, would have to be interprovincial; nevertheless, the goods
do cross Ontario's border initially), and whether or not such regula-
tion would be exclusively in the general interest of the Dominion.
It is unfortunate that the decision in 1. v. Campbel did not go on to
consider the possibility of justification under Trade and Commerce.
What does the future hold for the liberal view of the flow of
interprovincial or external trade as justification for federal legislation
27 (1959) 29 W.W.R. 369.
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under the commerce head? The possibilities are well summed up in
the following passage:
The view in question represents a break with the past. The formalism,
the atmosphere of unreality, which pervade the previous decisions are
absent. Constitutional adjudication is achieved not by the application of a
mechanical formula but by the elemental process of examining the facts. 28
Also:
Parliament has been denied adequate regulatory control over business,
trades, industry and related activities-has been denied adequate control
over the economic life of the nation. This lacuna is due to the restrictivejudicial approach to the interpretation of the commerce clause. In Canada
'the federal commerce power' has not been 'as broad as the economic
needs of the nation'. Whether the influence of recent developments Is to
be permitted to rectify this state of affairs, only the future will tell.29
W. P. GRANT
R. v. McKAY [1964], 1 O.R. 641, 43 D.L.R. (2d) 401 (C.A.)-CONsTI-
TUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES-
ZONING BY-LAW PROHIBITING SIGNS ON PRIVATE PROPERTY-APPLICA-
BILITY TO FEDERAL ELECTION SIGNS-In the recent decision of R. v.
McKay1 the Ontario Court of Appeal reinstated a conviction for
breach of a by-law,2 enacted under the authority of the Municipal
Act 3 and the Planning Act, 4 prohibiting the posting of signs, includ-
ing election signs, on private property. The McKays owned a house
in the township of Etobicoke in a residential area designated R2.
During the last federal election they had attached to a wire over
their veranda a 14" x 16" sign proclaiming: "Vote David Middleton,
New Democratic Party". They were convicted before a magistrate.
On appeal before Hughes J. in the Supreme Court of Ontario5
the conviction was successfully attacked on the basis that although
28 Smith, p. 172.
29 bid, at p. 180.
1 [1964] 1 O.R. 641; (1964) 43 D.L.R. (2d) 401.
2 USE: No building, structure or land shall be used and no building or
structure shall be hereafter erected, structurally altered, enlarged or main-
tained except for the following uses:
9.3.1.7. SIGNS: Signs in accordance with the regulations in s. 6.14.
S. 6.14(e). SIGNS: Residential-one non-illuminated real estate sign not
exceeding four square feet in area, advertising the sale, rental or lease of
any building, structure or lot and/or one non-illuminated trespassing, safety
or caution sign not exceeding one square foot in area, and/or one sign Indi-
cating the name and profession of a physician shall be permitted.
3 R.S.O. 1960, c. 249, s. 379(1), para. 122. "By-laws may be passed by the
councils of local municipalities, 122. For prohibiting or regulating the erection
or signs or other advertising devices and the posting of notices on buildings
or vacant lots within any defined area or areas on or land abutting on any
defined highway or part of a highway."
4 R.S.O. 1960, c. 296, s. 30(1), para. 2. "By-laws may be passed by the
councils of municipalities, 2. For prohibiting the erection or use of buildings
or structures for or except for such purposes as may be set out in the by-law
within the municipality or within any defined -area or areas or upon land
abutting on any defined highway or part of a highway."
5 [1963] 2 O.R. 162; 38 D.L.R. (2d) 668.
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